The Influence of Buy-side Analysts on Mutual Fund Trading by Frey, Stefan & Herbst, Patrick
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1343771
The Influence of Buy-side Analysts on
Mutual Fund Trading∗
Stefan Frey†





We present evidence of the impact of buy-side analysts on the behavior and per-
formance of fund managers. Using data provided by a large global asset manager,
we relate buy-side analysts’ recommendations to fund transactions on a daily ba-
sis. Our results show that buy-side analysts have a significant influence on trading
decisions: Fund managers almost certainly follow recent recommendation revisions
in their trades. Fund flows and sell-side recommendations matter as well, but to
a lesser extent. Positive abnormal returns to buy-side analysts’ revisions are also
reflected in the performance of mutual fund trades: trades triggered by buy-side
recommendations have higher returns than other trades.
Keywords: Buy-side analysts, analyst recommendations, mutual funds, investment deci-
sions, investment performance
JEL classification: G23, G11, G29, M41
∗The authors gratefully acknowledge the data provision by an asset management firm. The usual
disclaimer applies.
†Institute of Money and International Finance, Ko¨nigsworther Platz 1, 30167 Hannover, Germany;
email: frey@gif.uni-hannover.de. Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) is
gratefully acknowledged.
‡Accounting and Finance Division, Stirling Management School, University of Stirling, Stirling,
FK9 4LA, UK; email: patrick.herbst@stir.ac.uk.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1343771
1 Introduction
The asset management industry is responsible for a large amount of capital invested on
behalf of its clients: globally, $ 53.4 trillion – almost 110% of world GDP – were under
management in 2006, $ 24.3 trillion invested in equities alone.1 Professional money man-
agers rely on various sources of information in order to guide their investment decisions.
In equity markets, sell-side analysts employed by brokerage firms and investment banks
as well as analysts employed by independent research providers are a prominent source of
information. However, investment management firms also employ their own so-called buy-
side analysts as an internal source of investment ideas. Although less visible than sell-side
analysts, these internal analysts account for a significant share of the overall spending on
equity research: According to the advisory firm Tabb Group (2006), US and UK asset
managers spent $ 7.7 billion on internal and $ 7.1 billion on external research in 2006. In
the period 2000 to 2002, US equity funds’ self-reported weight put on in-house analysts
averages 73% to 75% (see Cheng, Liu, and Qian, 2006). While sell-side analysts have been
analyzed with scrutiny by investors, regulators and academics (see e.g. Boni and Womack,
2003), buy-side analysts have received far less attention. Little is known about the im-
pact of these internal analysts relative to external analysts in money managers’ investment
process so far.
We empirically analyze how the information provided by buy-side analysts affects the in-
vestment decisions of professional money managers. Specifically, we approach the following
questions: To what degree do managers follow their in-house analysts’ recommendations?
To what degree do they follow the recommendations issued by sell side research analysts,
which represent public information in the market? What are the performance implications
of this behavior? Answers to these questions provide evidence on the value of internal
analysts as an important organizational aspect of many asset management firms. To ad-
dress them, we use a proprietary data set from a large, globally active asset management
firm. The data is – to our knowledge – unique in its details. We observe in-house analyst
recommendations and changes therein as well as fund positions, transactions and money
flows on a daily basis for a set of European equity mutual funds between 2004 and 2007.
Our results show that buy-side analysts (BSAs) have a statistically and economically
significant effect on the trading behavior of fund managers. Buy transactions coincide
largely with more favorable internal stock recommendations: The direction of trades in a
1Estimates by the World Bank and the Boston Consulting Group (2007).
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stock matches those of a prior recommendation change in almost 90% of the cases dur-
ing the week following the new recommendation. Even after controlling for other trading
influences (most notably fund flows and sell-side recommendations), we find that recent
recommendation changes induce a same-directional shift in the probability of a stock pur-
chase of 27 to 41 percentage points. This effect is considerably larger than the effect of the
sell-side analysts (SSAs) on transactions.
The analysis of returns to recommendation revisions and fund manager transactions
suggests that BSAs positively impact trading performance for our sample funds. Rec-
ommendation upgrades by BSAs yield positive abnormal returns while downgrades show
negative abnormal returns. The difference in returns is between 1.3 and 2.0 percentage
points over a one to two months horizon. Similarly, fund transactions that are very likely
to be triggered by recommendation revisions yield positive abnormal return differences
of 2.2 percentage points during the first two months. More importantly, these transac-
tions yield higher return differences than transactions that cannot be attributed to BSA
recommendations alone. The transaction impact of BSAs thus also leads to a positive
performance impact for our sample funds.
Our analysis relates to two strands of the literature. The first provides analyses of
research analysts and their value for investments. Most of the empirical contributions
here focus on the behavior and incentives of sell side analysts (see e.g. Womack, 1996;
Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman, 2001; Irvine, 2004; Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004;
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee, 2004; Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman, 2007). Given
the private nature of the data, there is hardly any empirical work on buy-side analysts.
The papers by Groysberg, Healy, and Chapman (2008) and Groysberg, Healy, Serafeim,
Shanthikumar, and Gui (2010) are an exception as they use proprietary data from a US
asset management firm in order to compare recommendations and earnings estimates by
BSAs and SSAs. The analysis in Groysberg et al. (2010) suggests that the investment
value of BSA recommendations is lower than the value of the sell side analysts. Earnings
estimates by BSAs are also less precise than those by SSAs (Groysberg et al., 2008). These
results support the conventional wisdom in the industry that SSAs provide higher value
than BSAs as they are both more able and face stronger performance incentives.
The second strand of related literature focusses on the investment behavior of money
managers, specifically on the role of public and private information for fund managers.
Contributions in this strand are either theoretical (see e.g. Kyle, 1989; Chen and Wil-
helm Jr., 2010) or try to infer the use of private information indirectly (see e.g. Cheng
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et al., 2006; Kacperczyk and Seru, 2007; Pomorski, 2008). In particular, Kacperczyk and
Seru (2007) find that fund managers whose portfolio changes are less correlated with sell
side analyst recommendations show better fund performance. The authors attribute this
to higher manager skills which yield better private information (or private interpretation of
public signals). Cheng et al. (2006) analyze the role of BSAs by using funds’ self-reported
weight put on BSA research. Analyzing fund performance, they find some evidence that
higher use of BSAs yields higher fund performance.
At first glance, the findings by Groysberg et al. (2008, 2010) appear in conflict with
those of Cheng et al. (2006) or Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) about the value of BSAs:
in the former paper, observed BSA recommendations have lower performance than SSA
recommendations while in the latter two papers, fund managers’ relying more on private in-
formation than sell-side information perform better. However, none of the studies directly
links fund managers’ trading decisions to private information such as BSA recommenda-
tions. Our paper is the first to bridge this gap and relates fund transactions to BSA
and SSA recommendations. The analysis shows that BSA recommendations trigger larger
same-directional trades more frequently than SSA recommendations. The relative impact
of BSAs and SSAs is consistent with the two types of analysts providing fund managers
with, respectively, private and public investment signals. Investors receiving both types of
signals react more strongly to the private signal.2 Public signals will be more reflected in
stock prices than private ones as a larger set of investors observe and responds to public
signals. As the investor’s private signal is revealed less in prices, his response to this signal
should be stronger (unless its precision is too low). This differential reaction to public
and private signals also reconciles the seemingly conflicting findings of Cheng et al. (2006),
Groysberg et al. (2008, 2010) and Kacperczyk and Seru (2007).
Our paper represents a step in quantifying the role of buy-side analysts in the return
generating process. The value of relying on internal analyst teams is an important deter-
minant for the organization of asset management activities. It is also relevant for fund
investors to gauge the value added of choosing an asset manager with internal research
capabilities (at potentially higher management cost).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data set. In section 3, we
analyze the impact of BSAs and SSAs on the trading behavior of fund managers. Section
2To have some investment value, the “public” signal needs to be imperfectly observable, e.g. due to
liquidity trades (see e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985). Chen and Wilhelm Jr. (2010) and
Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) provide models incorporating private and public signals.
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4 then considers analysts’ performance impact. Section 5 estimates the value generated by
BSAs for the asset management firm. Section 6 concludes.
2 Sample and data
The analysis combines data from both public and private sources. A global asset man-
agement firm which belongs to the top ten global asset managers in terms of assets under
management is the main data provider. From one of their European offices, we obtained a
rich set of information on their mutual funds and buy-side analysts. This data is augmented
by stock and sell-side analyst information from public sources.
Mutual fund data: We use a sample of 14 equity funds investing in European equities
between June 2004 and December 2007. All these funds are managed by individual fund
managers who belong to the firm’s European equities team. Managers of a fund can change
over time. Most fund managers also manage institutional equity portfolios. Although
information on these portfolios is not included, these institutional portfolios share the
basic strategy in terms of equity investments. The fund data used thus proxies the full
spectrum of investment strategies pursued within the company.
The daily information we use includes all trades undertaken within the funds, all fund
investment positions, and net money flows into or out of these funds. We also obtained
basic fund information such as the ID of the fund manager, the fund benchmark relevant
for fund manager evaluation as well as changes in any of this information during the sample
period. We supplement this data with daily fund prices and benchmark returns.
Buy-side analyst information: Internal stock recommendations originate from two
groups of analysts, research analysts and small cap fund managers. The main task of the
latter group is to manage small cap equity portfolios but they also give stock recommen-
dations for a subset of the stocks they invest in. Research analysts are sector specialists
who follow stocks in the sector of their expertise. These analysts very much resemble the
sell-side analysts and often worked for the sell-side previously or move to the sell-side later
on. The job of a research analyst in our sample firm has a career path of its own. These
analysts are hence no junior analysts who will be fund managers in the future. Although a
few analysts also manage sector portfolios, their role as analyst is never secondary. Stock
recommendations are analysts’ key output and a major determinant for analysts’ perfor-
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mance evaluation and hence bonus payment. Another task of the research analysts is to
discuss their views and industry/company news with fund managers. Although research
analysts have their own company models, unlike sell-side analysts they are not required to
provide earnings estimates on a regular basis.
We use daily information on recommendations for European stocks issued by all internal
research analyst.3 The information contains the stock, an analyst ID, and the current rec-
ommendation. Analyst stock recommendations are coded 1 for “sell”, 2 for “underperform”,
3 for “hold”, 4 for “buy” and 5 for “strong buy”. Changes in recommendations are recorded
in the data set for the same day as the analyst announces the change if this occurs before
the market opens. Else, they are recorded as of the subsequent trading day. These timing
conventions are also used in the internal evaluation of the analysts. Unless stated otherwise,
when considering changes in buy-side analysts’ recommendations, we only use the direction
of the change. A value of +1, 0, or −1 for a buy-side recommendation change indicates a
more favorable recommendation (upgrade), no change, or a less favorable recommendation
(downgrade), respectively.
Sell-side analyst information: For each stock traded by one of the sample funds, we
collect sell-side analyst recommendations from the Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S database.
These recommendations are originally coded in the opposite direction of the buy-side rec-
ommendations (from 1 for “strong buy” to 5 for “sell”) and are recoded to match the
buy-side structure. A higher recommendation thus implies a more favorable view of the
stock in both data sets. We use the daily mean consensus recommendation for each stock
as well as detail information for individual analysts’ recommendations. The change in the
consensus over a period is the difference between the consensus value at the end of the
period and the value on the trading day preceding the period.
Although the consensus recommendation is an easily observable and hence prominent
indicator, professional investors might consider alternative investment signals more im-
portant, not least because SSAs may provide biased investment recommendations (see
Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007a,b). We therefore also include I/B/E/S information
about SSAs’ earnings estimates. Specifically, we calculate earnings revisions as the rela-
tive change in the consensus earnings estimate over a specified period. In order to have a
rolling measure of the consensus earnings, we use a time-weighted average of the earnings
estimates for FY1 and FY2. The weighting factor for the FY1 estimate is the number of
3We disregard recommendations issued by small cap fund managers as these are not their main task.
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trading days until the reporting date of the FY1 earnings relative to the number of trading
days between the reporting days for FY1 and FY2. The weighting factor for FY2 is then
1 minus the factor for FY1. By this weighting structure, FY1 estimates receive a lower
weighting the closer the corresponding reporting date.
As the market consensus in many stocks is determined by a large number of SSAs,
professional investors may decide not to pay attention to all recommendation or earnings
revision issued. Rather, some SSAs or brokers might be followed more closely than others.
We consequently also consider a sub-set of sell-side firms by identifying the key brokerage
firms for our sample firm. We measure the relevance of a sell-side firm for our sample
firm by the overlap between the stocks traded by the mutual funds and stocks covered
by the sell-side firm. Hence, sell-side brokers which cover a higher number of stocks that
were also traded by the mutual funds are deemed more important. We rank all brokers
covered in the I/B/E/S detail database and consider only the top 10 brokers in this ranking.
The overlap between these firms’ coverage and the stocks traded ranges from 226 to 242
stocks. Analysts employed by these 10 brokers will be termed key SSAs. Recommendation
revisions by key SSAs are then reported as the number of upgrades minus the number of
downgrades over a specified period of time.
Sample description: We restrict our sample to those stocks that were covered by the
buy-side analysts at some time (i.e. where there is at least one buy-side analyst recommen-
dation) during January 2004 and December 2007. We then collect all transactions by the
mutual funds in these stocks and add buy-side recommendations, fund flows, the sell-side
consensus and stock returns. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample.
For recommendation or earnings revisions, cash flows and returns, we consider sev-
eral, non-overlapping time periods. For example, we differentiate the sum of cash flows by
whether they were reported on the same or previous day as the trade (Cash Flowt,t−1) or
during the remainder of the preceding trading week (Cash Flowt−2,t−5), where t denotes
the day of the transaction. Since cash flows have very immediate effect on the portfolio
structure, we don’t consider cash flows which occurred over a week ago. For BSA recom-
mendation revisions we use the period of one day prior to one day after the transaction
(BSA recommendation revisiont+1,t−1) in order to account for fund managers receiving in-
formation about planned revisions by the BSAs. We also consider revisions during the
remainder of the preceding week (BSA recommendation revisiont−1,t−5) and changes that
happened up to a month earlier (BSA rec. changet−6,t−20). The same three time periods
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are used for revisions by key SSAs, however the most recent day being the revision day.
The consensus recommendation or earnings variables and past stock returns are included
for three non-overlapping subperiods within the past six months.
3 Transaction impact
In this section, we consider the impact of buy-side and sell-side analyst recommendations
on the trading behavior of fund managers. In the first step, we look at the structure of
transactions around buy-side recommendation changes. We then turn to a more thorough
analysis of the determinants of trading decisions and BSA revisions.
3.1 Recommendations and the structure of transactions
If buy-side analyst recommendations matter for fund managers’ investment decisions, we
should expect to see changes in their behavior when recommendations are changed. Over
the sample period, we observe 536 recommendation changes. Table 2 (Panel A) presents
the distribution of these revisions in a transition matrix. The table shows the distribution
of new recommendations by the prior recommendation level. The last column in Panel A
gives the percentage of recommendation revisions by the prior recommendation level. Rec-
ommendation reiterations are not recorded for the buy-side analysts in the sample. Hence,
the main diagonal of the transition matrix is empty.
The numbers in Panel A show that most of the recommendations by buy-side analysts
are either a hold (recommendation of 3) or a buy (recommendation of 4). Over 76.5% of
recommendation revisions start at these levels, and the transitions are also mostly towards
these levels. Only very few recommendations originate from or target the lowest recom-
mendation level. Additionally, the transition matrix shows that most recommendation
revisions are single level changes. In later analyses, we will therefore neglect the size of
recommendation changes and simply differentiate between upgrades and downgrades.
Panel B of Table 2 illustrates the distribution of buy versus sell transactions in stocks
whose recommendations are changed. Specifically, the table reports the proportion of buy
transactions among all transactions in a stock within the period starting one trading day
prior to the recommendation change and ending one trading day afterwards. These buy
proportions are averaged and presented for the same recommendation transitions as in
Panel A. The results show that upgrades (numbers above the main diagonal) and down-
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grades (numbers below the main diagonal) go along with very different trading behav-
ior: Upgrades are accompanied with mostly buy transactions, whereas sell transactions
dominate for recommendation downgrades. As an example, consider an initial hold rec-
ommendation (level of 3). For the 65.3% of stock upgrades to a buy recommendations
(recommendation level 4, see Panel A), buy transactions make up 86.8% of all transactions
in these stocks in the three day period around the recommendation change. Conversely, for
the 33.6% of stocks downgraded to underperform (recommendation level 2), 87.0% (100%-
13.0%) of transactions are sells. The results in Panel B show a strong congruence between
fund managers’ trading decisions and buy-side recommendation revisions.
Figures 1 and 2 provide further evidence of the impact of buy-side analysts’ revisions
on fund manager trading. Both figures analyze trades in stocks around recommendation
revisions. The event day (of the revision) is t=0. Similarly to Panel B of Table 2, Figure 1
reports the proportion of buys (in percentages) up to five weeks prior to and after the
revision. The dark-shaded bars show proportions of buys around upgrades, the light-shaded
bars show buy proportions around downgrades. Figure 2 looks at the trading intensity of
fund managers around recommendation revisions. It shows the average number of trades
observed in a stock around its revision day, again for upgrades (dark-shaded bars) and
downgrades (light-shaded bars) separately. In both figures, numbers are averaged on a
daily basis for the first week around revisions. For weeks -5 to -2 and 2 to 5, the figure
reports weekly averages.4 Additionally, the dashed line in each figure represents the average
during weeks -5 to -2 for both upgrades and downgrades.
Figure 1 shows that the congruence between recommendation revisions and fund man-
agers’ trades extends over a fairly long period. Recommendation upgrades (downgrades)
shift post-revision trades towards buys (sells) for at least three weeks, with weakening effect
over time: The difference between the proportion of buys after upgrades versus downgrades
on revision days is over 80 percentage points and declines to roughly 20 percentage points
three weeks afterwards. Trading activity also increases around recommendation revisions,
as Figure 2 illustrates. On the revision days, average activity is almost six times higher
than the average activity in weeks -5 to -2 prior to revisions. However, the effect appears
not to be long-lasting as it vanishes within the first week following a revision. Both fig-
ures strongly highlight the impact of buy-side analysts’ recommendations on fund manager
behavior.
4The change from weekly to daily (to weekly) averaging is also highlighted in the figure by changes in
the background shading.
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A notable feature in Figures 1 and 2 is that the structure of transactions already changes
in the days prior to recommendation revisions. This is not surprising for trades happening
one to two days ahead of a revision: By the timing convention, a revision during trading
hours results in a lag of one day between the day a revision is published internally and the
recorded announcement day. Additionally, analysts regularly communicate their planned
revisions to fund managers. Updating their valuation models and writing an accompany-
ing research report might then delay the officially recorded announcement by another day.
These effects can best be seen in Figure 2 as the pick-up in trading activity is evident
two days ahead of the revision day. Figure 1, however, shows that the distribution of
buys and sells changes strongly up to four days ahead of the revision. This pre-revision
effect is unlikely to be due to time lags between an analyst’s decision to revise a recom-
mendation and the official announcement. Rather, it is due to other interactions between
fund managers and buy-side analysts. In particular, fund managers and buy-side ana-
lysts share and discuss their views about stocks. These discussions can be around specific
events, such as company meetings, company announcements, or institutionalized meetings
between analysts and fund managers.5 This may enable analysts to give an early indication
of their plans to revise a recommendation or may allow fund managers to correctly assess
the direction of the next revision. Alternatively, fund managers might be able to convince
analysts and simply trade according to their view. Although it is not discernible from the
data which mechanism drives the pre-revision effects, conversations with fund managers
and analysts suggest that revisions determine fund managers’ transactions rather than vice
versa.
3.2 Explaining the direction of trades
The previous analysis illustrates that buy-side recommendations have a strong effect on
whether fund managers buy or sell a specific stock. Therefore, we look at this decision in
more detail. We first show that buy-side analyst recommendation revisions and fund flows
have a high impact on the trade direction even after controlling for other investment signals.
We then analyze whether buy-side analyst recommendations are more than a compound
signal of these public investment signals.
5For example, fund managers used to specialize within the team on certain industries. Hence, analysts
know whom to approach when there is any new information or upcoming events. Also, sector analysts and
the fund management team meet on a regular basis.
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Table 3 presents the results of a logit regression of buys versus sells on various internal
and publicly observable variables. The dependent variable takes on a value of one if a stock
transaction by a single mutual fund during a day is a buy transaction and zero if the trans-
action is a sell. The explanatory variables include the internal information about buy-side
analyst recommendations (both current levels and past changes) and cash flow informa-
tion. As the publicly observable investment signals, we use consensus recommendations
and earnings estimates. We use the current levels of the consensus recommendation as well
as the value of past changes therein, distinguishing between three sub-periods within the
preceding six months to account for how recent the changes in the variable are. For the
consensus earnings estimates, we consider percentage changes over the same sub-periods
as for recommendations. The consensus variables provide a signal of the average analyst’s
recommended transaction and should take into account all relevant stock information up
to the day of transaction. In addition, we use recommendation revisions by key SSAs for
three sub-periods within the preceding month. We also include past stock returns as a
control variable. This variable captures potential momentum or contrarian trading by the
fund managers.
The results of the logit analysis show that all internal variables are highly statistically
significant whereas only some of the public investment signals determine trading decisions.
Recommendation upgrades by either the buy-side or the sell-side (consensus or key brokers)
positively affect the propensity to buy a stock for all time periods between the revision and
the transaction considered here. The effects are statistically significant for the most recent
recommendation revisions by key SSAs as well as for consensus revisions that occur more
than a week prior to a transaction. Hence, the key SSAs have a very immediate effect,
whereas changes in the consensus matter only with some lag but for a longer period of time.
Cash inflows also increase the probability of a buy transaction. This is as expected as fund
managers usually prefer to hold only small cash positions. The inflow of new money thus
triggers at least some buy transactions. Although statistically significant, recommendation
levels show less clear results. While they increase the propensity to buy when issued by a
buy-side analyst, higher recommendation levels have a negative effect when issued by the
sell side. This is consistent with fund managers considering recommendation changes to
contain investment value whereas the level of a recommendation is less relevant. Similar
to recommendation levels, past stock returns show no consistent behavior. While the most
recent returns positively affect the propensity to buy, less recent returns have the reverse
effect. Lastly, consensus earnings revisions are statistically insignificant.
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The last columns of Table 3 report the average marginal effects of changes in the ex-
planatory variables. The results show that the internal signals have the highest economic
impact on trade directions. Most notably, a buy-side analyst’s recommendation upgrade
(downgrade) at the same or previous day increases (decreases) the probability that fund
managers buy that stock by 41 (27) percentage points. Although the effect decreases over
time it is still economically high (between 13 and 16 percentage points) if the recommenda-
tion change happened between two to four weeks before the transaction. As a comparison,
the maximum effect that a similar change in the consensus recommendation has is 18 per-
centage points. Although it generally depends on the coverage of a stock, a one-unit change
within a single week is highly unlikely. The effect of a one standard-deviation change in the
consensus is below two percentage points (0.18×0.096 ≈ 0.017). Nevertheless, the sell-side
information signal has an impact that persists even for periods of up to six months. Key
SSAs have a very immediate impact: a single upgrade on the trading or the preceding day
shifts the likelihood of a buy transaction by 7 percentage points. A cash flow of one percent
of a fund’s asset value over the same or previous trading day changes the buy probability
by 16 percentage points in the same direction. The effect is reduced to five percentage
points if the cash flow occurs 5 to 3 days before the trading date. Finally, past returns
and recommendation levels, although statistically significant, show low economic impact
on trade directions.
3.3 The direction of buy-side analysts’ revisions
In order to gauge whether BSA recommendation revisions are more than a combination of
the public investment signals considered by fund managers, we now turn to the recommen-
dation upgrade or downgrade decision. Similar to the trade direction analysis, we perform
a logit regression of the direction of the stock recommendation revisions. The dependent
variable thus takes on a value of one (zero) if the analyst upgrades (downgrades) the stock.
For the independent variables, we use the set of publicly observable variables (consensus
and key SSA recommendations, consensus earnings and returns) as in the analysis of trade
directions.
The results and average marginal effects of the logit analysis are presented in Table 4.
Only few variables turn out to be statistically significant (at the 5% level). The most
important variables in the analysis are the revisions by key SSAs. In contrast to the
transaction analysis, revisions by these key analysts affect BSAs’ revisions positively for
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all sub-periods within the prior month. A recommendation upgrade by a single key SSA
increases the likelihood that a BSA revision is an upgrade by 30 percentage points if it
happens on the same or previous day. If the sell-side upgrade happens up to a month
ago, the effect is still significant with a marginal effect of 7 percentage points. In contrast
to the key SSAs, consensus recommendations are not statistically significant. However,
consensus earnings revisions have some, albeit limited, positive impact on the direction of
BSA revisions. Finally, stock returns over the prior month have a statistically significant
effect. However, the effects are rather inconclusive as their direction changes within that
period.
In sum, our results suggest that buy-side analysts’ changes in recommendations play an
important role as internal investment signals. Their impact is also larger than that of the
sell-side consensus. And even though buy-side analysts and fund managers might partly
follow similar investment signals, the recommendation revisions by the buy-side analysts
can be interpreted to have additional information content for the fund managers.
4 Performance impact
The previous results show that buy-side and, to a lesser extend, key sell-side analyst recom-
mendations affect trading decisions. We now consider the impact of analyst recommenda-
tions on fund performance. Before analyzing the performance of fund transactions, we first
consider the performance of buy-side and key sell-side analysts’ recommendation changes.
4.1 The performance of analysts’ recommendation revisions
Buy-side analysts’ performance: We measure buy-side analyst performance by cal-
culating the percentage return of each stock upgrade and downgrade for holding periods
of one, five, 10, 15, 20, 40, 60 and 120 trading days as of the day of the recommendation
change. We report both raw returns as well as abnormal returns. A stock’s abnormal re-
turn is computed as the difference between the raw return and the market return adjusted
for the stock-specific beta. Stock-specific betas are the result of a regression of daily stock
returns on an intercept and the market return during the sample period. We use the MSCI
Europe index for the market return. Returns are averaged for all upgrades and downgrades
with equal weighting. Table 5 presents the performance results of recommendation changes
as well as the difference in performance between upgrades and downgrades.
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Looking at raw returns, Panel A shows that stocks that have been upgraded have
almost steadily increasing performance over time. Even the returns to downgraded stocks
turn positive and increase over time. The general increase in stock prices is not overly
surprising, given the time period of our analysis. However, the results also show that
the return difference between recommendation upgrades and downgrades is positive and
significant for the first two to three months. This return difference builds up from 0.44
to 1.94 percentage points over the first weeks and reaches a maximum of 2.50 percentage
points after one month. The latter structure of returns is also visible in abnormal returns
(Panel B). The difference in returns between upgrades and downgrades increases from 0.56
to 1.99 percentage points within one month and decreases thereafter. Overall, it is possible
to generate positive returns by following buy-side analysts recommendation changes.
Key sell-side analysts’ performance: We next consider the performance of the top
10 brokers’ analyst recommendation revisions. Very recent revisions by the key SSAs
positively affect fund manager transactions, even though the effect is much weaker than
for BSAs. For example, combining the revisions by key SSAs with our transaction data
shows that the same-day percentage of buys following key SSA upgrades versus downgrades
is 50.7% versus 22.4%, respectively.
Similarly to the analysis in table 5, we calculate percentage returns of each stock up-
graded and downgraded by key SSAs for the various holding periods. We measure the
analyst return based on the closing price on the revision day. This implies that we dis-
regard the potential announcement day effect that has been found for SSA revisions (see
Francis and Soffer, 1997; Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004). Although we thus miss out a part
of the stock return generally attributed to a revision, this lag in the performance calcula-
tion is more relevant for fund managers as they are usually not able to react fast enough
to realize the announcement day return.
Table 6 presents the performance results of key SSA recommendation changes as well
as the difference in performance between upgrades and downgrades. The results show that
SSAs provide valuable investment recommendations: Both raw and abnormal returns of
upgrades are statistically significant and positive for all return periods considered. Rec-
ommendation downgrades yield negative raw returns initially, and significantly negative
abnormal returns. The return differences are highly statistically significant, positive and
increase from 0.36 percentage points to 1.02 percentage points for abnormal returns.
Although the patterns of returns for SSA and BSA revisions are similar, the returns to
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SSA revisions appear slightly weaker than BSA revisions over the first months. However,
in contrast to BSA revisions, key SSAs’ revisions remain significantly positive even for the
6 months period.
4.2 Performance of fund managers’ transactions
Given that BSAs and key SSAs generate valuable investment signals and that fund man-
agers appear to trade consistently with these signals, we should expect to see positive per-
formance of trades induced by these revisions. We now analyze fund managers’ transactions
and consider the returns to buy and sell transactions as well as their return differences.
Buy-side analysts’ performance impact: Table 7 presents the performance of two
transaction samples: The first sample (in columns two and three, six and seven, ten and
eleven) contains all transactions where a same-directional revision by a BSA is observed
in the period of one trading day prior to one trading day after the transaction. From the
analysis in 3, we know that these transactions are very likely to be driven by the internal
investment signal. The second set of trades contains those without a same-directional
revision by the BSA during the three days around the transaction. The second sample
thus contains transactions that are not (solely) driven by the BSA recommendation but
might be based on other information.
We look at raw (Panel A) and abnormal returns (Panel B) over the same time-horizons
as in Tables 5 and 6. Although the funds in our sample have different, fund-specific
benchmarks (given their differences in investment focus and style), we continue using the
MSCI Europe index as the market return. Unreported calculations using market-adjusted
returns with fund-specific benchmarks yield very similar results. We present returns for
buy and sell transactions as well as the (within-sample) difference in these returns.
The results for the raw returns show again positive returns for both buys and sells
over the longer return periods. Raw returns are highest mostly for buys around upgrades
and lowest for sells triggered by downgrades. For both samples, the difference in returns
between buys and sells is positive and significant during the first two months.
Looking at abnormal returns provides further information about the return structure
of transactions. Most notably, the results suggest that the negative abnormal returns
of fund managers’ sells contribute most to trading returns. These returns are almost
all significantly negative, particularly those triggered by BSA downgrades. Stocks sold
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around downgrades have abnormal returns of -1.20% within the first week and -3.26%
after 6 months. Sells without a BSA revision on the other hand underperform by less than
0.5% – still, the returns are significantly different from zero. Buy transactions show much
weaker evidence of positive abnormal returns. Only buys without upgrades have positive
and statistically significant returns (over the two-month period). Except for the one-day
performance, BSA driven buys show return differences which are statistically insignificant
from zero.
The differences in returns between buys and sells are positive and significant for both
samples during the first two months after the trade. The transactions driven by BSA
revisions reach a maximum difference of 2.50 percentage points after two weeks and the
difference remains significantly positive for two months. The time horizon for those trades
to be profitable is thus the same as for the BSA revisions themselves. The results suggest
that the return potential of BSAs’ revisions is captured by fund managers. In particu-
lar, fund managers seem to profit from negative revisions, whereas trades implementing
upgrades surprisingly show returns not significantly different from zero.
Table 8 presents a comparison of the return differences between buys and sells for
the two samples. While the return difference is always higher for transactions driven by
BSA revisions, the difference (in return differences) is only statistically significant during
the first month. Although fund manager trades seem to be more profitable if triggered
by BSA revisions, this can only be confirmed for a relatively short return horizon. Still,
overall the return analysis of transactions shows that BSAs positively affect fund managers’
transaction returns and thus improve fund performance.
Key sell-side analysts’ performance impact: We now consider the performance of
transactions which occur during the same day or one day after a recommendation revision
by one of the key SSAs. Because SSA revisions are not always followed, we compare the
performance of both buy and sell transactions for recommendation upgrades and down-
grades separately (see Busse, Green, and Jegadeesh, 2010, for a similar analysis). Trades
that are in the same direction as SSA revisions should not only contribute positively to
the overall fund performance. Rather, if fund managers are also able to discern profitable
and unprofitable stock recommendations, the return difference between buy and sell trans-
actions should be positive both for transactions following upgrades as well as following
downgrades.
Table 9 presents raw and abnormal returns to buy and sell transactions for stocks that
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were traded on the announcement day of a key SSA revision or one day afterwards. If
more than one key SSA revision occurs from different brokers during those two days, the
difference in the number of upgrades versus downgrades determines the direction of the
overall revision. We interpret an equal number of upgrades and downgrades as no revision.
The table distinguishes trades by the direction of the revision (upgrades versus downgrades)
and also presents averages over all buys or sells.
Looking at the abnormal returns to buy transactions in Table 9 reveals returns which
are either not significantly different from zero (for most buys around SSA upgrades) or
even significantly negative (for buys around downgrades). For return periods of 3 to 6
months, abnormal returns are significantly negative for each of the reported sets of buy
transactions. The results suggest that buy transactions around revisions by key SSAs add
no value at best or even negative abnormal longer-run returns at worst – irrespective of
the revisions’ direction.
The returns to sell transactions in Table 9 show that fund managers generate value
with their sell transactionss – similar to the results in Table 7. The effect is particularly
strong for sells around key SSA downgrades, but is also visible in sells which happen around
upgrades by key brokers. As in the case of buy transactions, abnormal returns are lowest
for return periods of 3 and 6 months. Overall, the evidence for key SSA revisions adding
value to fund managers’ trades is mixed when looking at the returns to buys and sells
separately.
In Table 10, we present return differences between buy and sell transactions around
key SSA revisions. Comparing return differences over different sub-sets of trades yields
some more information on the value of SSA revisions. The first pairs of columns reports
differences between returns to buys and sells by the direction of the revisions. Abnormal
return differences are significantly positive over the first three weeks for upgrades and over
the first two months for downgrades. These positive return differences suggest that to
some degree, fund managers are able identify profitable and unprofitable stock recommen-
dations and react accordingly. However, the next two column pairs show that only those
transactions which implement SSA revisions (congruent trades) yield significantly positive
abnormal returns. Contrarian trades which are opposite to the revisions yield no significant
abnormal returns. Hence, fund managers appear to be able to identify and follow revisions
which are valuable but are less able to identify potentially loss-making revisions by the key
brokers. Still, the overall return difference for all transactions around key SSA revisions is
significantly positive for the first two months. We can thus conclude that SSAs employed
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by the key brokers also provide investment signals which – to some degree – improve fund
performance.
5 Trading profits and the value of buy-side analysts
Our results show that BSAs positively affect fund manager trading and the performance
of their trades. However, the performance impact so far depends on the holding period
considered. We now provide a more concrete, albeit rough, estimate of the value of BSAs
for the asset management firm. To do so, we calculate realized trading profits for round-trip
transactions that were likely to be initialized by BSAs. We select all transactions in stocks
that had a same-directional revision in the period of one day prior to one day after the
transaction. We then eliminate all transactions which afterwards had no offsetting trades
by the same fund until the end of our sample period. For the remaining transactions,
we calculate round-trip raw profits using reported execution prices. As an illustration,
consider a BSA-induced buy of 100 shares in stock X at a price of 1 at date 0. The
transaction is offset by sells at two distinct dates: 60 shares of X are sold at a price of
2 at date 1, and 40 shares are sold at a price of 1.5 at date 2. The round-trip profit is
hence 80. The same profit results if 100 shares are sold at date 2 (the fund might have
already had a position in X at date 0) – only the sale of 40 shares is needed to close the
position. Thus, offsetting transactions need not be contained in a single trade and might
be part of an even larger trade. Also, subsequent transactions other than offsetting trades
are disregarded until the position is closed: the trading profits in the example remain
unaffected by additional purchases of X between date 0 and date 2. We thus assume that
the BSA-induced transaction is always closed first.
We provide several adjustments to the raw profits generated by the round-trip trans-
actions. Market-adjusted profits are derived by deducting the profits from equal-sized
investments into the MSCI Europe index on the transaction day. Investment returns from
this hypothetical portfolio are realized at the same point(s) in time as the stock investment.
In order to account for the stock-specific risk, we also calculate beta-adjusted profits by
adjusting the investment into the market index by the stock’s beta. Finally, we derive
profits when transactions are executed without transaction costs and net of transaction
costs. Transaction costs for stocks are included in our data set, and we use transaction
costs of 5 basis points for investments into the market index.
Table 11 presents the results for the profits from 346 round-trip transactions follow-
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ing BSA revisions. The average raw return before transaction costs amounts to almost
e 110,000 or a total profit of e 37.9 million during the 3.5 years of the sample. Transac-
tion costs reduce this profit by almost e 4 million. Adjusted profits are considerably lower,
with beta-adjusted profits being at the lowest level. Net of transaction costs, beta-adjusted
profits amount to e 4.9 million a year.
As transaction profits at first accrue to mutual fund investors, we need an estimate
for the profits these transactions generate for the asset management firm. For this, we
assume that the trading profit generated in a year is invested in the market portfolio and
yearly pays out management fees. Discounting the infinite stream of fee income yields a net
present value for the asset management firm. Writing this net present value as a fraction













rd + f − rM(1− f)
,
where pit denotes the trading profit, f the management fee, rM the return on the market
portfolio and rd the discount rate. Using the CAPM for the discount rate, we can write
rd = rf + β(rM − rf ) with rf as the risk-free rate. The mutual funds in our sample charge
management fees between 1.5% and 2.0% of assets. We use a risk-free rate of 3%, an equity
premium of 5.5% (see e.g. Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton, 2006) and a “financials”β of 1.3.
Running the numbers results in a net present value which is between 50.4% and 57.7% of
the trading profit.6 Hence, the value of the buy-side analysts would be between e 2.49 and
e 2.85 million per year.
During the sample period, the asset management firm employed between 18 and 23
research analyst at various experience levels. Assuming an average yearly cost per analyst
of e 400,000 (approximately US$ 500,000 to 550,000) and employment of 20 analysts
implies that the value of these analysts as derived above only amounts to 31% to 36%
of their costs. By these estimates, the profits generated by BSAs would fall significantly
short of their costs. However, these estimates should be rather interpreted as a lower bound
to the value of BSAs. First, not all transactions that are likely to be induced by BSAs
are included in the profit calculation of Table 11. For some BSA-induced transactions
there were no offsetting trades. Second, we considered only the direct revenue effect of
BSAs. Indirect effects arise if fund returns enhanced by BSAs also yield higher inflows as
6Varying the risk-free rate between 2% and 4%, the equity premium between 4% and 7% and β between
1.1 and 1.5 results in a NPV range between 33% and 82% of trading profits.
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investors prefer to invest into better-performing funds (see e.g. Ippolito, 1992; Chevalier
and Ellison, 1997). Moreover, the additional returns generated from BSA recommendations
might enable the asset manager to charge higher fund fees.
6 Conclusion
Equity research analysts provide financial market information that can be sold in two
ways, directly and indirectly (see Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988, 1990; Biais and Germain,
2002). Sell-side analysts are direct sellers of information whereas buy-side analysts and as-
set managers sell their information indirectly. In many asset management firms, the task of
gathering and producing investment information and the task of making investment deci-
sions are separated. Fund managers may hence rely on both information sources and decide
for themselves on the use of the information. This paper analyzes how fund managers use
private (buy-side) and public (sell-side) information by directly linking recommendations
from both sources to transactions.
Our results show that fund managers react most strongly to recommendation changes by
buy-side analysts. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) have already documented that the information
content of sell-side stock recommendations is highest in recommendation changes. The
response by fund managers suggests that the same is true for buy-side recommendations.
Additionally, the private nature of buy-side recommendations probably ensures that prices
will not (instantly) reflect the information. It is thus more profitable to respond to a signal
if it is private. The higher impact of buy-side recommendations, particularly in comparison
with the sell-side consensus, found in our analysis is consistent with this interpretation.
The analysis of the returns to buy-side analyst recommendations shows that following
buy-side analysts’ revisions can be profitable for fund managers. Transactions triggered
by buy-side analyst revisions yield positive abnormal returns that exceed those of other
transactions. In sum, the behavior of fund managers and impact of buy-side analysts found
in the analysis accords well with models of investment decisions and market microstructure
under public and private information.
Since our data come from a single firm, our results are clearly not generally applicable
to the overall asset management industry. However, our results show a consistency of
the sample firm’s business model of using sell-side information while at the same time
employing buy-side analysts. As this is a widely adopted business model, our analysis can
be of interest to other firms in the industry as well as fund investors.
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Figure 1: Percentage of buy transactions around BSA recommendation revisions
This figure reports the average proportion of buys (in percentages) in a stock around the day (t=0) a
buy-side analyst revises the stock’s recommendation. The dark-shaded bars show buy proportions around
upgrades, the light-shaded bars show buy proportions around downgrades. Averages are taken on a daily
basis for the first week around revisions (white background). For weeks -5 to -2 and 2 to 5, the figure
reports weekly averages (shaded background). The dashed line denotes the average for upgrades and
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Figure 2: Trading activity around BSA recommendation revisions
This figure reports the average number of trades in a stock around the day (t=0) a buy-side analyst
revises the stock’s recommendation. The dark-shaded bars show the number of trades around upgrades,
the light-shaded bars show number of trades around downgrades. Averages are taken on a daily basis for
the first week around revisions (white background). For weeks -5 to -2 and 2 to 5, the figure reports weekly
averages (shaded background). The dashed line denotes the average for upgrades and downgrades over
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for all transactions in stocks that have at least one buy-side recom-
mendation between January 2004 and December 2007. Sign of transactiont indicates whether the transac-
tion is a buy (+1) or sell (-1). t denotes the day of the transaction. BSA recommendation revisionτ,τ−i is
an indicator whether the BSA stock recommendation has been reduced (-1), increased (+1) or is unchanged
(0) within the period τ − i to τ . Cash Flowτ,τ−i is the total net cash flow of the fund trading the stock
over the period. Key SSA recommendation revisionτ,τ−i is the difference in the number of upgrades and
downgrades by key SSAs within the period τ − i to τ . Key SSAs are those employed by the top 10 brokers
with highest overlap of their coverage with the stocks covered and traded by the buy-side firm. Cons.
recommendation revisionτ,τ−i is the difference between the consensus recommendation value in τ and its
value in τ − i− 1. Cons. earnings revisionτ,τ−i is the relative change in the weighted consensus earnings
forecast between τ and τ−i−1. The weighted consensus is obtained by weighing the FY1 earnings forecast
by the number of trading days until the FY1 reporting date relative to the number of trading days between
reporting FY1 and FY2; FY2 earnings are weighted by 1 minus the weight of FY1 earnings. Returnτ,τ−i
is the percentage change between the closing stock price in τ and τ − i. BSA recommendationt and Cons.
recommendationt denote the buy-side and consensus recommendation level, respectively, of the stock on
day t. BSA and consensus recommendations are coded from 1 for “sell” to 5 for “strong buy”.
Mean Median StdDev Min Max
Sign of transactiont -0.280 -1.000 0.960 -1.0 1.0
BSA recommendation revisiont+1,t−1 -0.001 0.000 0.155 -1.0 1.0
BSA recommendation revisiont−2,t−5 -0.001 0.000 0.113 -1.0 1.0
BSA recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 -0.002 0.000 0.210 -1.0 1.0
Cash Flowt,t−1 -0.174 -0.086 2.345 -40.8 24.9
Cash Flowt−2,t−5 -0.445 -0.183 2.167 -40.7 25.2
Key SSA recommendation revisiont,t−1 -0.004 0.000 0.250 -4.0 3.0
Key SSA recommendation revisiont−2,t−5 0.001 0.000 0.319 -4.0 3.0
Key SSA recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 0.016 0.000 0.617 -6.0 5.0
Cons. recommendation revisiont,t−5 0.001 0.000 0.053 -1.0 0.6
Cons. recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 0.003 0.000 0.096 -1.0 1.0
Cons. recommendation revisiont−21,t−120 0.036 0.040 0.227 -1.1 1.1
Cons. earnings revisiont,t−5 0.003 0.000 0.041 -1.0 1.0
Cons. earnings revisiont−6,t−20 0.010 0.000 0.068 -1.0 1.0
Cons. earnings revisiont−21,t−120 0.064 0.058 0.175 -1.0 1.0
Returnt−1,t−5 0.249 0.238 4.786 -62.4 41.0
Returnt−6,t−20 1.179 1.198 6.040 -53.7 48.5
Returnt−21,t−120 7.566 6.985 15.073 -65.6 157.2
BSA recommendationt 3.633 4.000 0.708 1.0 5.0
Cons. recommendationt 3.671 3.710 0.381 2.2 4.8
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Table 2: The distribution of recommendation revisions and associated transactions
This table reports in Panel A the distribution of recommendation revisions for each prior recommendation
level. The last column of Panel A shows the distribution of all prior recommendations. Panel B reports the
percentage of buy transactions in stocks with a recommendation revision by prior and new recommendation.
Percentages are calculated for all transactions in the stock in the period one trading day prior to one trading
day after the recommendation revision. BSA recommendations are coded from 1 for “sell” to 5 for “strong
buy”.
Panel A: BSA recommendation revisions: Transition matrix (%)
to recommendation
from rec. 1 2 3 4 5 Sample (%)
1 . 50.0 50.0 . . 0.3
2 0.9 . 83.0 15.1 0.9 16.2
3 0.4 33.6 . 65.3 0.8 39.9
4 0.4 7.5 79.2 . 12.9 36.6
5 . . 21.7 78.3 . 7.0
No. of observations: 536
Panel B: Buy percentage around recommendation revisions
to recommendation
from rec. 1 2 3 4 5
1 . . 100.0 . .
2 . . 70.9 90.9 100.0
3 0.0 13.0 . 86.8 100.0
4 0.0 16.0 8.0 . 64.5
5 . . 6.9 10.5 .
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Table 3: Logit analysis of transaction sign
This table reports parameter estimates and average marginal effects for the logit analysis of fund managers’
trading direction. The dependent variable is each transaction’s sign and takes on a value of 1 (0) for a
buy (sell) transaction. t denotes the day of the transaction. The explanatory variables are described
in Table 1. The Return and Cons. earnings revision variables are normalized to units of 10 percentage
points. Standard errors (SE) are given in parentheses. The Change column presents the unit of the change
underlying the marginal effect calculation. The R2 reported is the maximum re-scaled R2. BSA and
consensus recommendations are coded from 1 for “sell” to 5 for “strong buy”.
Marginal Effects
Variable Estimate SE Change Effect SE
Intercept -0.31 (0.17) na na na
BSA recommendation revisiont+1,t−1 2.06 (0.15) +1 0.41 (0.02)
-1 -0.27 (0.01)
BSA recommendation revisiont−2,t−5 1.43 (0.17) +1 0.30 (0.03)
-1 -0.22 (0.02)
BSA recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 0.74 (0.08) +1 0.16 (0.02)
-1 -0.13 (0.01)
Cash Flowt,t−1 0.79 (0.04) ±1% 0.16 (0.01)
Cash Flowt−2,t−5 0.24 (0.02) ±1% 0.05 (0.00)
Key SSA recommendation revisiont,t−1 0.36 (0.07) ±1 0.07 (0.01)
Key SSA recommendation revisiont−2,t−5 0.09 (0.05) ±1 0.02 (0.01)
Key SSA recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 0.03 (0.03) ±1 0.01 (0.01)
Cons. recommendation revisiont,t−5 0.42 (0.31) ±1 0.08 (0.07)
Cons. recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 0.91 (0.17) ±1 0.18 (0.04)
Cons. recommendation revisiont−21,t−120 0.24 (0.07) ±1 0.05 (0.02)
Cons. earnings revisiont,t−5 0.05 (0.04) ±10pp 0.01 (0.01)
Cons. earnings revisiont−6,t−20 -0.04 (0.02) ±10pp -0.01 (0.00)
Cons. earnings revisiont−21,t−120 0.01 (0.01) ±10pp 0.00 (0.00)
Returnt−1,t−5 0.29 (0.04) ±10pp 0.06 (0.01)
Returnt−6,t−20 -0.11 (0.03) ±10pp -0.02 (0.01)
Returnt−21,t−120 -0.05 (0.01) ±10pp -0.01 (0.00)
BSA recommendationt 0.05 (0.02) ±1 0.01 (0.01)
Cons. recommendationt -0.09 (0.05) ±1 -0.02 (0.01)
R2 0.1892
No. of observations 19,566
27
Table 4: Logit analysis of BSA recommendation revisions
This table reports parameter estimates and average marginal effects for the logit analysis of buy-side
analysts’ recommendation revisions. The dependent variable is the direction of the recommendation change
and equals 1 (0) for an upgrade (downgrade). t denotes the day of the recommendation change. The
explanatory variables are described in Table 1. The Return and Cons. earnings revision variables are
normalized to units of 10 percentage points. Standard errors (SE) are given in parentheses. The Change
column presents the unit of the change underlying the marginal effect calculation. The R2 reported is the
maximum re-scaled R2. BSA and consensus recommendations are coded from 1 for “sell” to 5 for “strong
buy”.
Marginal Effects
Variable Estimate SE Change Effect SE
Intercept 0.06 (0.87) na na na
Key SSA recommendation revisiont,t−1 1.36 (0.40) ±1 0.30 (0.09)
Key SSA recommendation revisiont−2,t−5 0.56 (0.27) ±1 0.12 (0.06)
Key SSA recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 0.32 (0.15) ±1 0.07 (0.03)
Cons. recommendation revisiont,t−5 1.55 (1.33) ±1 0.34 (0.30)
Cons. recommendation revisiont−6,t−20 -0.70 (1.03) ±1 -0.15 (0.23)
Cons. recommendation revisiont−21,t−120 0.19 (0.41) ±1 0.04 (0.09)
Cons. earnings revisiont,t−5 0.15 (0.35) ±10pp 0.03 (0.08)
Cons. earnings revisiont−6,t−20 0.44 (0.20) ±10pp 0.10 (0.05)
Cons. earnings revisiont−21,t−120 0.01 (0.05) ±10pp 0.00 (0.01)
Returnt−1,t−5 0.73 (0.18) ±10pp 0.16 (0.04)
Returnt−6,t−20 -0.33 (0.17) ±10pp -0.07 (0.04)
Returnt−21,t−120 -0.08 (0.06) ±10pp -0.02 (0.01)
Cons. recommendationt -0.06 (0.25) ±1 -0.01 (0.06)
R2 0.1526
No. of observations 534
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Table 5: Performance of BSA revisions
This table reports % returns of stocks upgraded and downgraded by the buy-side analysts as well as the
difference in returns (in percentage points). Stock returns are calculated using closing prices, starting
with the closing price on the event day, and are averaged over each return period. t-statistics are given in
brackets. Panel A reports raw returns, Panel B reports abnormal returns using the beta-adjusted MSCI
Europe index.
Upgrades Downgrades Difference
Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat
Panel A: Raw returns
1 day 0.168 [1.45] -0.274 [-2.16] 0.442 [2.58]
1 week 0.598 [2.59] -0.400 [-1.73] 0.998 [3.05]
2 weeks 1.530 [4.98] -0.415 [-1.25] 1.944 [4.30]
3 weeks 2.051 [5.18] -0.146 [-0.45] 2.197 [4.31]
1 month 1.999 [4.70] -0.501 [-1.39] 2.500 [4.48]
2 months 2.773 [4.53] 1.019 [1.97] 1.754 [2.19]
3 months 3.418 [4.49] 1.665 [2.51] 1.753 [1.73]
6 months 5.772 [5.56] 4.166 [4.76] 1.606 [1.18]
Panel B: Abnormal returns
1 day 0.194 [1.91] -0.362 [-3.04] 0.556 [3.55]
1 week 0.448 [2.23] -0.408 [-2.07] 0.856 [3.04]
2 weeks 0.849 [3.11] -0.677 [-2.33] 1.526 [3.83]
3 weeks 0.985 [2.83] -0.783 [-2.91] 1.768 [4.02]
1 month 0.803 [2.13] -1.184 [-3.92] 1.987 [4.11]
2 months 0.392 [0.67] -0.896 [-1.99] 1.288 [1.75]
3 months -0.141 [-0.20] -1.281 [-2.25] 1.140 [1.24]
6 months -0.252 [-0.26] -1.193 [-1.56] 0.941 [0.76]
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Table 6: Performance of key SSA recommendation revisions
This table considers the recommendation revisions by key SSAs. The table reports % returns of stocks
upgraded and downgraded by these analysts as well as the difference in returns (in percentage points).
If there are multiple revisions, the majority of upgrades or downgrades determines the revision direction;
for equal numbers of upgrades and downgrades, the revisions are discarded. Stock returns are calculated
using closing prices, starting with the closing price on the event day, and are averaged over each return
period. t-statistics are given in brackets. Panel A reports raw returns, Panel B reports abnormal returns
using the beta-adjusted MSCI Europe index.
Upgrades Downgrades Difference
Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat
Panel A: Raw returns
1 day 0.249 [7.67] -0.144 [-4.00] 0.394 [8.11]
1 week 0.591 [9.22] 0.002 [0.03] 0.589 [5.99]
2 weeks 0.781 [8.76] 0.059 [0.63] 0.722 [5.55]
3 weeks 1.068 [9.99] 0.346 [3.07] 0.722 [4.64]
1 month 1.396 [11.64] 0.610 [4.88] 0.786 [4.54]
2 months 2.468 [14.93] 1.489 [8.61] 0.979 [4.09]
3 months 3.537 [17.13] 2.325 [10.97] 1.212 [4.10]
6 months 6.585 [21.67] 5.001 [16.05] 1.584 [3.64]
Panel B: Abnormal returns
1 day 0.179 [6.48] -0.184 [-5.60] 0.363 [8.46]
1 week 0.259 [4.85] -0.239 [-3.41] 0.498 [5.66]
2 weeks 0.208 [2.75] -0.392 [-4.61] 0.600 [5.27]
3 weeks 0.209 [2.31] -0.403 [-4.07] 0.613 [4.57]
1 month 0.226 [2.19] -0.387 [-3.53] 0.613 [4.07]
2 months 0.368 [2.58] -0.403 [-2.62] 0.771 [3.67]
3 months 0.340 [1.89] -0.664 [-3.54] 1.004 [3.87]
6 months 0.507 [1.89] -0.505 [-1.85] 1.012 [2.64]
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Table 7: BSA revisions and the performance of transactions
This table reports % returns of fund managers’ buy and sell transactions as well as the difference in returns (in percentage points).
Transactions used are either those with same-directional recommendation revision -1 to +1 trading days around the trade date (columns
headed Upgrade, Downgrade and Same-dir. Revision) or those without such a revision -1 to +1 trading days around the trade date (No
Upgrade/Downgrade/Same-dir. Revision). Stock returns are calculated using closing prices, starting with the closing price on the event day,
and are averaged over each return period. t-statistics are given in brackets. Panel A reports raw returns, Panel B reports abnormal returns
using the beta-adjusted MSCI Europe index.
Buy transactions Sell transactions Difference Buy/Sell
Upgrade No Upgrade Downgrade No Downgrade Same-dir. Revision No Same-dir. Revision
Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat
Panel A: Raw returns
1 day 0.297 [2.13] 0.095 [4.59] -0.759 [-3.66] 0.017 [1.15] 1.057 [4.22] 0.078 [3.09]
1 week 0.185 [0.71] 0.302 [7.53] -1.261 [-3.60] 0.161 [5.22] 1.446 [3.31] 0.141 [2.79]
2 weeks 0.938 [2.63] 0.591 [10.78] -1.777 [-3.97] 0.304 [7.09] 2.715 [4.74] 0.287 [4.13]
3 weeks 1.313 [3.10] 0.926 [13.93] -0.978 [-2.51] 0.398 [7.65] 2.291 [3.98] 0.527 [6.24]
1 month 1.310 [2.47] 1.083 [13.97] -1.280 [-2.98] 0.602 [10.22] 2.590 [3.80] 0.480 [4.94]
2 months 2.468 [3.31] 1.917 [18.32] 0.021 [0.03] 1.312 [15.86] 2.446 [2.36] 0.605 [4.53]
3 months 2.621 [3.08] 2.526 [20.62] 0.884 [0.92] 2.338 [23.38] 1.737 [1.35] 0.187 [1.18]
6 months 3.849 [3.46] 5.444 [31.81] 2.260 [1.78] 4.907 [34.75] 1.589 [0.94] 0.538 [2.42]
Panel B: Abnormal returns
1 day 0.326 [2.48] 0.071 [3.85] -0.887 [-4.38] -0.008 [-0.62] 1.213 [5.03] 0.079 [3.51]
1 week 0.321 [1.40] 0.116 [3.37] -1.202 [-3.60] -0.070 [-2.61] 1.523 [3.76] 0.186 [4.27]
2 weeks 0.416 [1.35] 0.136 [2.88] -2.083 [-4.67] -0.142 [-3.89] 2.499 [4.61] 0.278 [4.66]
3 weeks 0.580 [1.60] 0.229 [3.95] -1.599 [-4.27] -0.258 [-5.70] 2.180 [4.17] 0.486 [6.62]
1 month 0.497 [1.06] 0.204 [2.99] -1.824 [-4.50] -0.239 [-4.73] 2.321 [3.75] 0.443 [5.21]
2 months 0.456 [0.65] 0.267 [2.82] -1.771 [-2.72] -0.422 [-5.89] 2.227 [2.33] 0.689 [5.81]
3 months -0.242 [-0.31] -0.110 [-1.01] -2.202 [-2.51] -0.325 [-3.69] 1.960 [1.67] 0.214 [1.53]
6 months -1.214 [-1.14] 0.093 [0.62] -3.264 [-2.97] -0.071 [-0.57] 2.050 [1.34] 0.164 [0.84]
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Table 8: Return differences for transactions with or without BSA revisions
This table reports the difference in returns (in percentage points) between fund managers’ buy and sell
transactions for stocks with same-directional BSA revisions during the period -1 to +1 trading days around
the trade date and for stocks with no such revisions in that period. The last two columns present the
difference in these differences between the two samples. Stock returns are calculated using closing prices,
starting with the closing price on the event day, and are averaged over each return period. t-statistics are
given in brackets. Panel A reports raw returns, Panel B reports abnormal returns using the beta-adjusted
MSCI Europe index.
Same-dir. Revision No Same-dir. Revision Difference
Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat
Panel A: Raw returns
1 day 1.057 [4.22] 0.078 [3.09] 0.979 [3.89]
1 week 1.446 [3.31] 0.141 [2.79] 1.304 [2.96]
2 weeks 2.715 [4.74] 0.287 [4.13] 2.428 [4.21]
3 weeks 2.291 [3.98] 0.527 [6.24] 1.764 [3.03]
1 month 2.590 [3.80] 0.480 [4.94] 2.110 [3.06]
2 months 2.446 [2.36] 0.605 [4.53] 1.841 [1.76]
3 months 1.737 [1.35] 0.187 [1.18] 1.550 [1.20]
6 months 1.589 [0.94] 0.538 [2.42] 1.052 [0.62]
Panel B: Abnormal returns
1 day 1.213 [5.03] 0.079 [3.51] 1.134 [4.68]
1 week 1.523 [3.76] 0.186 [4.27] 1.337 [3.28]
2 weeks 2.499 [4.61] 0.278 [4.66] 2.221 [4.07]
3 weeks 2.180 [4.17] 0.486 [6.62] 1.693 [3.21]
1 month 2.321 [3.75] 0.443 [5.21] 1.879 [3.01]
2 months 2.227 [2.33] 0.689 [5.81] 1.538 [1.60]
3 months 1.960 [1.67] 0.214 [1.53] 1.746 [1.47]
6 months 2.050 [1.34] 0.164 [0.84] 1.886 [1.23]
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Table 9: Performance of transactions around key SSA recommendation revisions
This table reports % returns of fund managers’ buy and sell transactions with revisions by key SSAs -1 to 0 trading days around the trade
date. If there are multiple revisions, the majority of upgrades or downgrades determines the revision direction; for equal numbers of upgrades
and downgrades, the transactions are discarded. Returns are reported for buys and sells, differentiated by whether the key SSA revisions are
upgrades or downgrades as well as aggregated over all buys or sells. Stock returns are calculated using closing prices, starting with the closing
price on the event day, and are averaged over each return period. t-statistics are given in brackets. Panel A reports raw returns, Panel B
reports abnormal returns using the beta-adjusted MSCI Europe index.
Buy transactions Sell transactions All Buys All Sells
Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade
(Congruent Buy) (Contrarian Buy) (Contrarian Sell) (Congruent Sell)
Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat
Panel A: Raw returns
1 day 0.026 [0.23] 0.001 [0.00] -0.082 [-0.92] -0.473 [-3.36] 0.016 [0.18] -0.314 [-3.44]
1 week 0.710 [3.10] -0.035 [-0.15] -0.089 [-0.50] -0.223 [-0.69] 0.427 [2.52] -0.169 [-0.83]
2 weeks 1.033 [3.58] 0.447 [1.43] 0.228 [0.87] -1.243 [-3.82] 0.810 [3.77] -0.645 [-2.91]
3 weeks 1.174 [3.53] -0.147 [-0.38] 0.202 [0.74] -1.752 [-4.59] 0.671 [2.64] -0.958 [-3.77]
1 month 1.414 [3.83] 0.266 [0.59] 0.562 [1.76] -1.346 [-3.48] 0.977 [3.40] -0.571 [-2.15]
2 months 1.706 [3.40] 0.407 [0.59] 1.474 [3.22] -0.958 [-1.75] 1.212 [2.97] 0.031 [0.08]
3 months 2.580 [4.28] 0.706 [0.62] 1.144 [1.76] -0.044 [-0.07] 1.867 [3.25] 0.439 [0.97]
6 months 4.819 [4.66] 2.271 [1.68] 2.577 [2.83] 1.248 [1.45] 3.850 [4.68] 1.788 [2.83]
Panel B: Abnormal returns
1 day 0.051 [0.60] -0.042 [-0.34] -0.089 [-1.19] -0.536 [-3.99] 0.016 [0.22] -0.354 [-4.14]
1 week 0.439 [2.27] -0.457 [-2.18] -0.457 [-2.94] -0.330 [-0.99] 0.098 [0.68] -0.381 [-1.84]
2 weeks 0.211 [0.89] -0.466 [-1.72] -0.357 [-1.58] -1.584 [-4.84] -0.047 [-0.26] -1.085 [-5.02]
3 weeks 0.213 [0.77] -1.059 [-3.40] -0.615 [-2.61] -2.206 [-6.47] -0.271 [-1.29] -1.559 [-6.91]
1 month 0.132 [0.42] -0.788 [-2.10] -0.430 [-1.64] -2.123 [-6.24] -0.218 [-0.90] -1.434 [-6.24]
2 months -0.404 [-0.94] -1.086 [-1.92] -0.252 [-0.65] -2.402 [-4.95] -0.663 [-1.94] -1.528 [-4.62]
3 months -1.111 [-2.12] -1.635 [-1.64] -1.526 [-2.53] -2.938 [-5.28] -1.310 [-2.63] -2.364 [-5.73]
6 months -1.529 [-1.69] -1.679 [-1.51] -2.133 [-2.45] -3.603 [-4.77] -1.586 [-2.26] -3.005 [-5.26]
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Table 10: Return differences for transactions with key SSA recommendation revisions
This table reports the difference in returns (in percentage points) between fund managers’ buy and sell transactions for stocks with revisions by
key SSAs -1 to 0 trading days around the trade date. Return differences are reported for transactions around upgrades (SSA Upgrade Trades)
and downgrades (SSA Downgrade Trades); for trades with same-directional SSA revisions (SSA Congruent Trades) and with opposite SSA
revisions (SSA Contrarian Trades); and for all trades with SSA revisions (All SSA Trades). Stock returns are calculated using closing prices,
starting with the closing price on the event day, and are averaged over each return period. t-statistics are given in brackets. Panel A reports
raw returns, Panel B reports abnormal returns using the beta-adjusted MSCI Europe index.
SSA Upgrade Trades SSA Downgrade Trades SSA Congruent Trades SSA Contrarian Trades All SSA Trades
Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat Returns t-stat
Panel A: Raw returns
1 day 0.108 [0.74] 0.474 [2.37] 0.499 [2.76] 0.083 [0.49] 0.330 [2.60]
1 week 0.799 [2.76] 0.189 [0.47] 0.934 [2.37] 0.054 [0.18] 0.595 [2.25]
2 weeks 0.805 [2.07] 1.690 [3.74] 2.276 [5.23] 0.219 [0.54] 1.455 [4.71]
3 weeks 0.972 [2.26] 1.606 [2.97] 2.926 [5.78] -0.348 [-0.74] 1.629 [4.53]
1 month 0.853 [1.75] 1.613 [2.70] 2.761 [5.16] -0.295 [-0.53] 1.548 [3.95]
2 months 0.232 [0.34] 1.364 [1.55] 2.664 [3.59] -1.068 [-1.29] 1.180 [2.13]
3 months 1.436 [1.62] 0.750 [0.57] 2.625 [3.03] -0.438 [-0.33] 1.428 [1.95]
6 months 2.243 [1.63] 1.023 [0.64] 3.571 [2.65] -0.305 [-0.19] 2.061 [1.99]
Panel B: Abnormal returns
1 day 0.140 [1.23] 0.494 [2.71] 0.587 [3.69] 0.046 [0.32] 0.370 [3.33]
1 week 0.895 [3.61] -0.127 [-0.32] 0.768 [2.00] 0.000 [0.00] 0.479 [1.90]
2 weeks 0.568 [1.74] 1.118 [2.63] 1.795 [4.44] -0.109 [-0.31] 1.039 [3.70]
3 weeks 0.828 [2.28] 1.146 [2.48] 2.419 [5.51] -0.444 [-1.14] 1.288 [4.18]
1 month 0.561 [1.37] 1.335 [2.64] 2.255 [4.85] -0.358 [-0.78] 1.216 [3.63]
2 months -0.152 [-0.26] 1.317 [1.77] 1.998 [3.08] -0.834 [-1.21] 0.865 [1.82]
3 months 0.415 [0.52] 1.303 [1.14] 1.827 [2.39] -0.108 [-0.09] 1.053 [1.63]
6 months 0.604 [0.48] 1.924 [1.43] 2.074 [1.76] 0.454 [0.32] 1.419 [1.57]
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Table 11: Profits generated by BSA-induced round-trip transactions
This table reports the average realized trading profit for round-trip transactions. The transactions used
are those with same-directional BSA recommendation revision -1 to +1 trading days around the initial
trade date that also have transactions reverting the initial trade. Profits are calculated without market
adjustment (Raw profits), adjusted for an equal investment in the MSCI Europe index (Market-adjusted
profits) and for a beta-adjusted investment into the MSCI Europe index (β-adjusted profits). Stock prices
used are reported transaction prices. Profits are calculated both gross and net of transaction costs. Trans-
action costs applied to the benchmark or risk-adjusted benchmark are 5 basis points. t-statistics are given
in brackets.
Gross of transaction costs Net of transaction costs
Mean (e) t-stat Mean (e) t-stat
Raw profits 109,676 [2.52] 98,610 [2.27]
Market-adjusted profits 81,695 [1.98] 73,951 [1.78]
β-adjusted profits 57,955 [1.56] 49,949 [1.34]
No. of round-trips 346
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